From the beginning of the 1860s, an economic crisis began in the country, which a number of economic historians associate with the refusal of Alexander II from industrial protectionism and the transition to a liberal policy in foreign trade (at the same time, historian P. Bairoch sees one of the reasons for the transition to this policy in the defeat of Russia in the Crimean War). So, within a few years after the introduction of the liberal customs tariff of 1857 (by 1862), cotton processing in Russia fell 3.5 times, and pig iron production decreased by 25%.However, the first signs of an economic crisis appeared already in 1859, when a financial crisis began, accompanied by a deterioration in the country's trade and payments balance.
The liberal policy in foreign trade continued in the future, after the introduction of a new customs tariff in 1868. Thus, it was calculated that, compared with 1841, import duties in 1868 decreased on average by more than 10 times, and for some types of imports - even by 20-40 times. According to M. Pokrovsky, “customs tariffs of 1857-1868. were the most preferential that Russia enjoyed in the 19th century…”. At the same time, the situation in the country's economy did not improve: modern economic historians characterize the entire period until the end of the reign of Alexander II and even until the second half of the 1880s. as a period of economic depression.
Evidence of slow industrial growth during this period is the production of pig iron, whose increase was only slightly ahead of population growth and lagged far behind other countries. So, over 20 years (from 1855-59 to 1875-79), iron smelting in Russia increased by only 67%, while in Germany it grew by 319% during this time, while the population of Russia grew at record highs. rates (growth over the specified period amounted to almost 40%). For comparison: in the 20 years that have passed since the death of Alexander II (from 1880-1884 to 1900-1904), with the same population growth rates, iron production in Russia increased by 487%, that is, it grew by 7-7, 5 times faster than in the era of Alexander II.
Contrary to the goals declared by the peasant reform of 1861, agricultural productivity in the country did not increase until the 1880s, despite the rapid progress in other countries (USA, Western Europe), and the situation in this most important sector of the Russian economy is also only worsened. During the reign of Alexander II, a famine periodically began, which had not been in Russia since the time of Catherine II and which took on the character of a real disaster (for example, a massive famine in the Volga region in 1873).
As stated in the late XIX century. M. M. Kovalevsky’s work, the liberalization of foreign trade created difficulties for increasing domestic production and led to a sharp increase in imports: from 1851-1856. to 1869-1876 imports grew almost 4 times. If earlier the trade balance of Russia was always positive, then during the reign of Alexander II it worsened. Starting from 1871, for several years it was reduced to a deficit, which by 1875 reached a record level of 162 million rubles, or 35% of exports .The trade deficit threatened to cause gold to flow out of the country and depreciate the ruble. At the same time, this deficit could not be explained by the unfavorable situation in foreign markets: for the main product of Russian exports - grain - prices in foreign markets from 1861 to 1880. almost doubled. During 1877-1881. the government, in order to combat the sharp increase in imports, was forced to resort to a series of increases in the level of import duties, which prevented further growth in imports and improved the country's foreign trade balance.
The only industry that developed rapidly was railway transport: the railway network in the country was growing rapidly, which also stimulated its own locomotive and wagon building. However, the development of railways was accompanied by many abuses and the deterioration of the financial situation of the state. Thus, the state guaranteed the established private railway companies full coverage of their expenses and also the maintenance of a guaranteed rate of return through subsidies. The result was huge budget expenditures to support private companies, while the latter artificially inflated their costs in order to receive state subsidies. Unpaid obligations of the government to private railway companies in 1871 amounted to 174 million rubles, and a few years later rose to 580 million rubles .
As S. Yu. Witte, who later became the Minister of Railways, wrote, the transfer of the railway business under Alexander II into the hands of companies that were private "only in name, and not in reality" led to a "completely impossible" situation, when the entire loss from the activities of these private companies (more than 40 million rubles a year) "fell on the state treasury, in other words, on the Russian people."In addition, by the end of his reign, most of these companies were divided among several "railway kings", which was a big problem for his successor: "of course, Emperor Alexander III could not help but be shocked by such a state of affairs that, as it were, special kingdoms were created in the state , railway, in which small railway kings reigned like: Polyakov, Blioch, Kronenberg, Gubonin, etc., etc. ”.
To cover budget expenditures, the state for the first time began to actively resort to external loans (there were almost none under Nicholas I). Loans were attracted on extremely unfavorable conditions: the commission to banks was up to 10% of the borrowed amount, in addition, loans were placed, as a rule, at a price of 63-67% of its face value. Thus, only a little more than half of the loan amount came to the treasury, but the debt arose for the full amount, and annual interest was calculated from the full amount of the loan (7-8% per annum). As a result, the volume of state external debt reached 2.2 billion rubles by 1862, and 5.9 billion rubles by the beginning of the 1880s.
Until 1858, a firm exchange rate of the ruble against gold was maintained, following the principles of the monetary policy pursued during the reign of Nicholas I. But starting from 1859, credit money was introduced into circulation, which did not have a firm exchange rate against gold. As indicated in the work of M. Kovalevsky, during the entire period of the 1860s-1870s, the state was forced to resort to the issuance of credit money to cover the budget deficit, which caused their depreciation and the disappearance of metal money from circulation. So, by January 1, 1879, the exchange rate of the credit ruble against the gold ruble fell to 0.617.
The Minister of the Interior N.P. Ignatiev in 1881 characterized the economic situation of the country as follows: “Industry is in a deplorable state, handicraft knowledge is not improved, factory business is placed in the wrong conditions and suffers a lot from the dominance of the theory of free trade and the occasional patronage of individual enterprises ». Disillusionment with the liberal economic policy by the end of the reign of Alexander II was so strong that the list of books banned by his successor (by decree of January 5, 1884), along with the works of Marx, Lassalle and Chernyshevsky, included the works of Adam Smith.
In general, characterizing the economic policy of Alexander II, M.N. Pokrovsky wrote that it was “a waste of money and effort, completely fruitless and harmful for the national economy ... They simply forgot about the country”. The Russian economic reality of the 1860s and 1870s, wrote N. A. Rozhkov, “was characterized by a grossly predatory character, the squandering of living and productive forces in general for the sake of the most elementary gain”; the state during this period "essentially served as a tool for the enrichment of the grunders, speculators, in general - the predatory bourgeoisie".
