Mikhail Tukhachevsky

Mikhail Nikolaevich Tukhachevsky - Soviet military leader, commander of the Red Army during the Civil War, military theorist, Marshal of the Soviet Union (1935). He was shot in 1937 in the "case of the anti-Soviet Trotskyist military organization", rehabilitated in 1957.

Studies and the First World War

Mikhail Tukhachevsky was born on February 4 (16), 1893 in the family of an impoverished nobleman. Father - Nikolai Nikolaevich Tukhachevsky (1866-1914). Mother - Mavra Petrovna Milokhova (1869-1941).

Childhood years were spent in the village of Vrazhsky, Chembarsky district, Penza province (now Kamensky district) and in Penza. In 1904-1909 he studied at the 1st Penza Gymnasium. Graduated from the Moscow Empress Catherine II Cadet Corps (1912).

In the Russian Imperial Army since 1912: after graduating from the cadet corps, he entered the Alexander Military School, which he graduated in 1914 in the top three in academic performance. At the end of his training, he chose to serve in the Life Guards Semenovsky Regiment. On July 12, 1914, he was promoted from sergeant major to second lieutenant with a referral to this regiment, where he was assigned to the 6th company of the 2nd battalion.

In the outbreak of the First World War, he took part in battles with the Austrians and Germans as part of the 1st Guards Division on the Western Front. Participant of the Lublin, Ivangorod, Lomzha operations. He was wounded, and for his heroism he was awarded orders of various degrees five times. On February 19, 1915, he was captured. After four unsuccessful attempts to escape from captivity, he was sent to a fugitive camp in Ingolstadt, where he met Charles de Gaulle. In September 1917, he made his fifth escape, which became successful, and on September 18 he managed to cross the border into Switzerland. In October 1917, he returned to Russia via France, England, Norway and Sweden. He was re-enlisted in the Semenovsky Regiment on November 27, 1917 as a company commander.

"It's not that he was cruel — he just had no pity" (French officer Remy Ruhr about Tukhachevsky, being with him in German captivity).

The Civil War in Russia

Tukhachevsky voluntarily joined the Red Army in March 1918, worked in the Military Department of the Central Executive Committee. He joined the RCP (b) in the early spring of 1918, was appointed military commissar of the Moscow Defense District.

In June 1918, he was appointed commander of the army of the Eastern Front. Miraculously escaped execution during the July mutiny, raised by the commander of the Eastern Front, M. A. Muravyov. In August, he commanded the 1st Soviet Army, which attempted to take Simbirsk, and in a fierce battle on August 14 (27) — 17 (30), on the outskirts of the city, he was defeated by Colonel V. O. Kappel's units, as a result of which the 1st Soviet Army was forced to retreat 85 kilometers west of Simbirsk. At the beginning of September, he prepared and conducted a successful operation by the army to capture Simbirsk, in which he showed military leadership qualities for the first time. Military historians note "a deeply thought-out plan of operation, a bold and rapid concentration of the main forces of the army in a decisive direction, timely delivery of tasks to the troops, as well as their decisive, skillful and proactive actions."

The Simbirsk operation was part of the general offensive of the Eastern Front in 1918-1919 of the Red Army and began only after the beginning of the Kazan operation in 1918, which aimed to capture Kazan, which was defended by the best troops of the People's Army, including the Kappel brigade. After V. O. Kappel and his units returned from near Kazan, the Simbirsk division of the Reds was pushed back beyond the Volga. But Kappel failed to return Simbirsk.

In December 1918, Lenin identified the south as the main direction of the war, and Tukhachevsky was appointed assistant commander of the Southern Front, who led an active offensive from November 3, 1918 (Tukhachevsky was listed as commander of the 1st Army until January 4), and from January 24, 1919 - commander of the 8th Army. As a result of disagreements with the front commander Gittis, Tukhachevsky resigned as commander of the 8th Army on March 15, 1919.

On April 5, Tukhachevsky takes command of the 5th Army. As part of the general counteroffensive of the Eastern Front, the 5th Army moved from retreat to offensive, and defeated the group of General Wojciechowski. In the future, the 5th Army provided the Belebeisk operation. In June, the 5th Army conducts the Birsk operation against the superior forces of the "whites" and ensures the Red Army's exit to the Southern Urals.

At the end of June-beginning of July, the 5th Army was ordered to carry out the main blow in the offensive of the Eastern Front. Tukhachevsky conducted the Zlatoust operation, as a result of which the attempts of the Western Army of the "whites" to gain a foothold along the Ural Ridge were thwarted. As a result of two weeks of fighting, Zlatoust was taken, the 5th Army took three thousand prisoners, its losses amounted to less than 200 people killed, wounded and missing.

Then the 5th Army conducted the Chelyabinsk operation. During its conduct, the command of the "whites" decided to deliberately lure the 5th army into the encirclement and defeat it. To solve this problem, shock groups under the command of Wojciechowski and Kappel were created as part of the White Western Army. On July 24, the 27th sd of the 5th Army took Chelyabinsk. After that, the white command began to carry out its plan, and the units of Wojciechowski and Kappel surrounded Chelyabinsk together with the red units that entered it. The Reds managed to save Chelyabinsk by mobilizing local workers. The situation was straightened out after the approach of units of the 5th sd and the 35th sd of the 5th Army and the strike of the 21st sd of the 3rd Army, sent by order of the commander of the Eastern Front of the Reds MV Frunze bypassing the Wojciechowski group. As a result, the White troops were defeated. For this operation Tukhachevsky was awarded the Order of the Red Banner.

After that, the Eastern Front of the Reds by the forces of the 5th Army of Tukhachevsky and the 3rd Army began the Peter and Paul operation. Initially, the troops of the 5th Army crossed the Tobol River and advanced 130-180 km in 10 days, but the White troops launched a counteroffensive and tried to encircle the 5th Army, which was forced to retreat back across the Tobol River. Only after the replenishment of the troops were the Reds able to resume the offensive and take Petropavlovsk.

After that, the Red offensive actually acquired the character of a pursuit, and it was conducted by the forces of the vanguard units of cavalry and infantry mounted on sleds. The Kolchak government abandoned the defense of Omsk and evacuated to the east, as a result, during the Omsk operation of the Reds, the 30,000-strong garrison of Omsk surrendered the city to the 27th Infantry Division of the Reds on November 15, who made a march 100 km away, without a fight.

Tukhachevsky was awarded an Honorary Revolutionary Weapon for his victory over Kolchak. He commanded the 5th Army until November 27, 1919.

On February 4, 1920, Tukhachevsky was appointed commander of the Caucasian Front, created specifically to complete the defeat of General Denikin's Volunteer Army and capture the North Caucasus before the war with Poland began. By the time of the appointment of Tukhachevsky, the troops of the Caucasian Front had already conducted the Dono-Manych operation, all the tasks of which were not completed, but the troops took their starting positions for the next stage of the North Caucasian operation. In the front line, the Reds were somewhat inferior to the whites in forces and means, therefore, when planning the Tikhoretsk offensive operation, massing of forces in the direction of the main strike was carried out. A feature of the planning of the operation was also the application of a series of consecutive strikes, coordinated by target, place and time. In turn, General Denikin was also preparing an offensive to capture Rostov and Novocherkassk. Initially, the troops of the Caucasian Front went on the offensive without waiting for the concentration of the 1st Cavalry Army, as a result of which the troops who occupied the bridgehead behind Manych were almost knocked back. As a result of the offensive of the Volunteer Corps on February 20, the "whites" captured Rostov and Nakhichevan.

On March 20, 1920, Commander-in-chief S. S. Kamenev reported to V. I. Lenin that it was planned to appoint M. N. Tukhachevsky as commander of the Western Front, "who skillfully and decisively carried out the last operations to defeat the armies of General Denikin," and on March 26, the Revolutionary Military Council of the Republic noted that "The Western Front is currently the most important front of the Republic."

The Soviet-Polish War of 1920

On April 25, 1920, the Polish Southeastern Front launched an offensive in Ukraine against the Soviet Southwestern Front, and on May 6, the Poles occupied Kiev. On April 28, the Main Command of the Red Army scheduled the offensive of the Western Front for May 14 until all preparations were completed in order to provide immediate assistance to the retreating Southwestern Front. Tukhachevsky took command of the Western Front on April 29. During the offensive against the Polish Northeastern Front, the right-flank 15th Army of A. I. Kork occupied the area of the so-called Smolensk Gate south of Polotsk, however, due to the lack of reserves, this success was not developed. In the center, the 16th Army crossed the Berezina, but by May 27, a Polish counterattack forced it to withdraw back. The unsuccessful outcome of the May front-line operation was the result of underestimating the enemy's forces, which concentrated large forces to prepare their offensive against the Western Front. At the same time, the offensive of the Western Front forced the Polish command to transfer two and a half divisions from its Southeastern Front, thereby weakening the offensive in Ukraine.

As a result of the counteroffensive of the Soviet Southwestern Front that began on May 26, the Polish armies of the Southeastern Front retreated almost to their original position before the April offensive, part of the forces from Belarus were transferred to Ukraine with the weakening of the Northeastern Front. With this in mind, Tukhachevsky decided to strike the first blow in the July operation with maximum forces. On July 4, the frontline went on the offensive, the 4th army broke through the Polish defense on the right flank, and the 3rd cavalry corps of G. D. Guy (military commissar A.M. Postnov) was introduced into the breakthrough, creating a threat of encirclement of the Polish 1st army. On July 11, units of the red 16th army took Minsk, from July 12 all the armies of the front moved to pursue the enemy, Vilna, Grodno, Baranovichi, Pinsk were taken. During the July operation of the Zapfront, the main forces of the Polish Northeastern Front suffered a heavy defeat. In turn, the Southwestern Front defeated the Polish Southeastern Front in July, and its armies occupied Western Ukraine.

At this stage of the Polish campaign, military decisions were completely subordinated to the political will of the leadership of the RSFSR. Having received a note from the British Foreign Minister Lord Curzon dated July 11 with a proposal for an armistice on the Grodno—Brest-Litovsk—Russian Rava line (the ethnographic borders of Poland defined by the Paris Peace Conference of 1919), Lenin regards it as an attempt to "snatch victory from the hands" and demands "a frenzied acceleration of the offensive against Poland." On July 22, Polish Foreign Minister Sapieha sent a radio message to the Soviet government offering an immediate truce. However, the successful offensive of the fronts gave rise to expectations in the Central Committee of the RCP (b) of the complete defeat of Poland. Commander-in-Chief S. S. Kamenev sets the task for the Western Front to seize Warsaw no later than August 12. At the same time, at the request of the RVS of the Southwestern Front, the Commander-in-Chief's directive transfers his main blow from the Brest-Litovsk to the Lviv direction, that is, the fronts had to advance in divergent directions.

Planning the Warsaw operation, Tukhachevsky refused a frontal main attack on Warsaw. Assuming that the main Polish forces were retreating north of the capital, he struck the main blow in this direction in order to defeat the enemy northwest of Warsaw. At the same time, the left flank of the front was poorly covered.

The decision to attack was made on August 8. At the same time, Tukhachevsky proposed to create a temporary operational point for the management of the 1st Cavalry and 12th armies, transferred to the Western Front from the Southwestern Front by the decision of the Politburo of August 2. These troops, as well as the 14th Army, were intended to reinforce the weak Mozyr group and the 16th Army, sent south of Warsaw, with the further aim of encircling the Polish capital from the south. On August 11, a final agreement was reached on the immediate turn of these armies from the Lviv to the Lublin direction. The command of the Southwestern Front stated that it was able to familiarize itself with the directive only on August 13 due to encryption distortions. On August 14, Commander-in-Chief S. S. Kamenev demands to turn the troops immediately. By this time, Pilsudski, who had launched an offensive on August 16 against the left flank of the Western Front, was already reaching the Ostrolenka-Lomzha-Bialystok line. Which was the defeat of the Red army.

Suppression of uprisings

In November 1920, Tukhachevsky commanded the troops of the Western Front in an operation to defeat the detachments of the People's Volunteer Army of General Bulak-Balakhovich that invaded the territory of Belarus from Poland.

On March 5, 1921, Tukhachevsky was appointed commander of the 7th army, aimed at suppressing the uprising of the Kronstadt garrison. By March 18, the uprising was suppressed.

In 1921, the RSFSR was engulfed by anti-Soviet uprisings, the largest of which in European Russia was the peasant uprising in the Tambov province. Regarding the Tambov mutiny as a serious danger, the Politburo of the Central Committee in early May 1921 appointed Tukhachevsky commander of the troops of the Tambov district with the task of completely suppressing him as soon as possible. According to the plan developed by Tukhachevsky, the uprising was mostly suppressed by the end of July 1921. In battles against detachments consisting mainly of peasants, Tukhachevsky used chemical weapons, artillery and aviation. Such measures as the capture and execution of hostages from among the relatives of the rebels were also widely used.

Marshal of the Soviet Union

In November 1935, Tukhachevsky was awarded the highest military rank - Marshal of the Soviet Union, and in April 1936 he was appointed 1st Deputy People's Commissar of Defense.

In all positions, Tukhachevsky considered his main task to prepare the Red Army for the future war. In January 1930, he presented Voroshilov with a report on the reorganization of the Armed Forces, which contained proposals to increase the number of divisions to 250, on the development of artillery, aviation, tank troops and on the basics of their use. The calculations given in the report, based on the experience of Germany and France in the First World War, contained, for example, the production of one hundred thousand tanks per year. Stalin did not approve Tukhachevsky's proposals, preferring the modernization of industry to the mass construction of tanks of the 1929 model. He insisted on the use of dual-use equipment (ground-anti-aircraft artillery, armored tractors), on the mass replacement of all artillery with dynamo-reactive (recoilless) guns.

His opinion was that, unlike the First World War, aviation and tanks ceased to be an auxiliary means of conducting infantry and artillery combat and there was "an opportunity through the mass introduction of tanks to change the methods of combat and operations. He proposed "a completely new approach to planning the entire system of weapons, organizations, tactics and training of troops. The underestimation of these opportunities may cause even greater shocks and defeats in the future war."

The theory of deep combat, the theory of continuous operations in one strategic direction were developed, and already in 1931 the actions of mechanized formations were proposed. Tukhachevsky is a supporter of an offensive strategy, he defended the unity of command, independence and initiative of the smallest units and criticized the "waiting for orders", considered chemical weapons as a full-fledged means of warfare (apparently, based on the experience of the First World War). He critically assessed the role of battleships in the future war and positively assessed the role of aircraft carriers.

Tukhachevsky "in November 1932 achieved the beginning of work on the design of rocket engines on liquid fuel.

He also closely followed the development of military thought in England, France, and Germany. According to his official position, Tukhachevsky took part in military cooperation between the USSR and Germany in the period from 1922 to 1933; and in 1932 he attended major maneuvers in Germany.

In January 1936, Tukhachevsky, as part of the Soviet delegation, attended the funeral of King George V of England in London.

Arrest and execution

Stalin took the side of Voroshilov, who was absolutely devoted to him, and already in August 1936 the first arrests of military leaders followed as part of a Large "Purge" of the Armed Forces: comcors V. M. Primakov and V. K. Putna were arrested. On May 10, 1937, Tukhachevsky was transferred from the post of first Deputy People's Commissar of Defense to the post of commander of the Volga Military District. On May 22, he was arrested in Kuibyshev, transported to Moscow on May 24, and on May 26, after confrontations with Primakov, Putna and Feldman, he gave his first confessions.

During the preliminary investigation, Tukhachevsky pleaded guilty to preparing a military conspiracy in the Red Army, the purpose of which was the violent overthrow of power and the establishment of a military dictatorship in the USSR. To realize success, it was planned to prepare for the defeat of the Red Army in a future war with Germany and, possibly, Japan. Tukhachevsky also admitted that he, as well as other participants in the conspiracy, had been given to German intelligence information constituting a state secret about the number and places of concentration of the Red Army in the border areas.

On June 11, 1937, the case on charges of Marshal of the Soviet Union Tukhachevsky, espionage, treason and preparation of terrorist acts was considered in a closed session of the Special Judicial Presence of the Supreme Court of the USSR.

By a court decision, Tukhachevsky was found guilty of committing crimes under Articles 58-1 "b" 58-3 58-4 58-6 and 59-9 of the Criminal Code of the RSFSR.

At 23:35, the verdict was announced — the death penalty without the right to a suspended sentence. Immediately after that, Tukhachevsky was shot in the basement of the building of the Military Collegium of the Supreme Court of the USSR.

The trial of Tukhachevsky marked the beginning of mass repressions in the Red Army in 1937-1938 .